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several court cases and administrative hearings from this Sur-

vey period indicate, tax officials and taxpayers continue to struggle to find the fine line that separates taxable transactions from
nontaxable ones. This task, always a difficult one, becomes increasingly
challenging in the face of a changing economy and a changing emphasis
on e-commerce and the Internet. Several legislative interim committees,
as well as committees like the E-Commerce and Technology Advisory
Group to the comptroller spent much of the Survey period working to
define policies to be implemented in practice and considered for possible
legislation for the 2001 session. In the meantime, it's time for our annual
look at what happened with existing legislation and its interpretation.
I.
A.

SALES TAX

APPLICATION OF THE TAX

Rylander v. Haber Fabrics Corp.1 addresses the distinction between
* B.A., Loyola University; M.A., University of Dallas; J.D., Southern Methodist
University. Partner, Hughes & Luce, LLP, Dallas, Texas; ohlenfc@hughesluce.com.
** B.B.A., J.D., Baylor University. Partner, Hughes & Luce, LLP, Dallas, Texas;
dorrilj@hughesluce.com.
*** B.S., East Central University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Associate,
Hughes & Luce, LLP, Dallas, Texas; davisl@hughesluce.com.
1. 13 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. App. - Austin 2000, no pet.).
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manufacturing and remodeling. Haber Fabrics is a manufacturer that
purchases second quality fabrics and converts the fabric to first quality
fabric that is sold to retailers. According to the court's findings, Haber
thoroughly inspects the purchased fabric to locate and remove or repair
any defects in the fabric. 2 Haber claimed the manufacturing sales tax exemption for the electricity, gas and packaging materials it purchased for
its manufacturing business. The comptroller argued that the process used
by Haber was remodeling or sorting and grading, which is not the same as
manufacturing, and that Haber was therefore not entitled to the manufacturing exemption. 3 The court rejected this view, holding that Haber's activities satisfied the comptroller's rule defining processing 4 because
Haber actually used labor to change the second quality fabric to first
quality fabric. 5 Additionally, the court noted other factors indicating
whether or not a process is considered to be manufacturing. Among
these factors was the fact that Haber's change in the fabric actually made
the fabric marketable and resulted in a product with a different purpose
from the original fabric. 6 The court also considered the fact that Haber's
processing added value to the fabric. 7 The court dismissed the comptroller's argument that Haber's activities were considered remodeling since
remodeling is by definition a process performed on items owned by another, and Haber was the actual owner of the fabric it processed. 8 In
permitting Haber's claim for exemption from sales tax for the electricity
used in its processing of the fabric, the court rejected the comptroller's
attempt to divide the processing into separate processing and nonprocessing parts, holding that the succession of acts performed by Haber
constituted a continuous act of processing. 9 The court was not concerned
by the fact that the actual floor space used for processing tasks was less
than that used for non-processing tasks because the electricity used for
manufacturing was proven to be more than fifty percent. 10
In a companion case related to the taxability of line-engineering services used to reconfigure mobile telephone networks, Rylander v. San
Antonio SMSA Ltd. Partnership," the comptroller asserted that the
purchase of such services along with the purchase of telecommunications
equipment from the same vendor rendered the services subject to sales
tax under section 151.007(b) of the Texas Tax Code. In Texas, the "essence of the transaction" doctrine is used to determine the taxability of a
transaction that bundles nontaxable services with taxable goods or services. If the true essence of the transaction is the receipt of the nontax2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 847.
Id. at 848.
See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.295(a)(7) (West 2000).
Haber, 13 S.W.3d at 848.
Id.
Id. at 849.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 849-50.
11 S.W.3d 484 (Texas App. - Austin 2000, no pet.).
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able service, then the entire transaction should be considered nontaxable.
On the other hand, if the true essence of the transaction is the receipt of
the taxable goods or services, then the entire transaction is considered to
be taxable. Relying on Sharp v. Direct Resources For Print, Inc.,12 the
court noted that "[w]hen a nontaxable service is bundled with a taxable
sale or service, [the Court applies] the 'essence-of-the-transaction' doctrine to determine whether the service is a part of the sale."' 13 The Austin
Court of Appeals took guidance from the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
decision in New England Telephone & Tel. Co. v. Clark,14 in which the
court determined that the purchase of engineering services and telecommunications equipment did not fit neatly into either essence-of-the-transaction category. The Clark court found that this combination transaction
fit into a third category, in which the elements of a mixed transaction
involving both a service and tangible personal property are "readily separable. ' 15 According to the Rhode Island court, if there was a "fixed and
ascertainable relationship between the value of the article and the value
of the services rendered, and each is a consequential element capable of a
separate and distinct transaction, then the elements must be analyzed as
16
separate transactions for tax purposes.'
Accordingly, the Austin Court of Appeals found that neither the lineengineering services nor the telecommunications equipment were incident to each other and that both the receipt of the service and the receipt
of the equipment were considered to be the true essence of the transaction. 17 Both the service and the equipment were found to have a separate
value that was distinct and identifiable. 18 Under such circumstances, the
court held that the elements of the transaction must be considered separately to determine the taxability of each element. 19 Additionally, the
court found that under the comptroller's Rule 3.357,20 similar treatment
21
is already accorded to sales of taxable services with nontaxable services.
Thus, the comptroller's attempt to treat the sale of taxable goods with
nontaxable services in a different manner (in favor of the taxing authority) was found to be unreasonable. 22 The court summarily rejected the
comptroller's proposal to treat the services as taxable because they were
invoiced on one contract, pointing out obvious manipulations that would
occur if such a rule were adopted. 23 Therefore, the fact that a single in910 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. App. - Austin 1995, writ denied).
San Antonio SMSA, 11 S.W.3d at 487.
624 A.2d 298, 302 (R.I. 1993) (cited in San Antonio SMSA as 627 A.2d 298).
Id. at 301.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
San Antonio SMSA, 11 S.W.3d at 488.
Id.
Id.
20. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357 (West 2000).
21. San Antonio SMSA, 11 S.W.3d at 489. This rule is one of several rules recognizing
that "unrelated services," as defined in the rule, does not become taxable merely because it
is sold with a taxable service.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 488.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
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voice or contract exists was specifically found to have no effect on the
24
taxability of this taxpayer's transaction.
In Serna v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co.,25 Serna, an individual taxpayer,
claimed that H.E. Butt Grocery Company ("H.E.B.") overcharged sales
tax on certain items and requested a refund of such overcharge in the
form of damages. Although H.E.B. discovered that it did indeed overcharge customers for sales tax during a two-and-one-half year period, it
did not seek a refund of such overpaid taxes. 26 The court turned to federal law for guidance in resolving Serna's claims, holding that H.E.B. was
merely acting as an agent of the state in collecting sales tax. 27 The court
also noted that limiting cases such as Serna's was appropriate based on
policy considerations; to permit otherwise would make investigation and
resolution of tax claims inadministerable by the comptroller and harmful
to judicial economy. 28 Thus, the court determined that Serna's claim for
refund from H.E.B. was improper since Serna's claim under the Texas
Tax Code was exclusively against the comptroller, not the vendor who
29
collects on behalf of the state.

B.

ADMINISTRATIVE

HEARINGS AND LETTERS

As in prior years, the comptroller issued several decisions analyzing the
distinction between nontaxable new construction and taxable repair and
remodeling. Although many decisions rejected the taxpayers' attempts to
achieve non taxable status for their services, 30 following are a few decisions in favor of the taxpayer.
Whether the installation of a roadway by taxpayers was nontaxable
new construction as opposed to taxable non-residential real property re31
pair and remodeling was one of the issues raised in a recent hearing.
The taxpayer argued that the road contract required the complete removal of the asphalt road and replacement with a steel-reinforced con24. Id. at 489.
25. 21 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. App. -San Antonio 1999, reh'g denied, Feb. 9, 2000, no pet.).
26. Id. at 332.
27. Id. at 333-34.
28. Id. at 334.
29. Id. at 336. See Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Ryland, 6 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. 1999)
(declining to accept comptroller interpretation that required indirect taxpayer to collect
refunds from its vendor rather than directly from state) (discussed at Ohlenforst et al.,
Taxation, 52 SMU L. REV. 1297, 1333 (1999)).
30. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,069 (Dec. 15, 1999) (holding that installation of a new roof that adds nonusable space is not new construction); Tex. Comp.
Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,501 (Dec. 29, 1999) (holding that taxpayer failed to prove that
finish out costs on warehouse qualified as new construction); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts,
Hearing No. 30,911 (Dec. 6, 1999) (holding that new installations of various safety systems
in two commercial office buildings were not non taxable as scheduled maintenance, but
were taxable modifications); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,262 (Apr. 10, 2000)
(holding that services performed on a parking garage used for twenty years before such
"modernization" do not qualify as new construction); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No.
38,733 (May 11, 2000) (holding that taxpayer failed to prove that asphalt pavement repairs
were substantial enough to be considered new construction).
31. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,276 (Jan. 31, 2000).
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crete roadway, making this a new construction project. The tax division
argued that the road contract, titled "Contract for Plant Roadway Repairs," was replete with references to repairs to be made pursuant to the
terms of the contract. Additionally, the tax. division claimed that the
length of the contract period (six years at the time of audit) was not reasonable for new construction and that due to the length of this contract,
some areas of the road may require repair before the roadway is entirely
complete. Referring to a 1997 hearing that involved the replacement of a
cable system, 32 the administrative law judge used the segmentary approach to determine the character of the roadway installation. Because
the entire roadway was to be replaced at the inception of the contract, the
contract was held to be new construction. The judge held that although
the three-year delay in construction was primarily due to the financial
limitations of the taxpayer, such new construction did not convert to a
taxable repair or remodel job during the audit period.
In another hearing analyzing the difference between nontaxable new
construction and taxable maintenance, the administrative law judge addressed several types of services. 33 The taxpayer installed two ramps, one
that was a new ramp and the other that was a new ramp replacing an
existing sidewalk. The administrative law judge held that the new ramp
was considered new construction since it added new footage to the facility, while the ramp that replaced the sidewalk would be treated as a remodeling of the sidewalk. The taxpayer also performed scheduled work
on some parking lots necessary to keep the lots safe, efficient and in continuous operation. The administrative law judge found that while a parking lot overlay and the subsequent restriping of the lot are tax-free
maintenance, the excavation and installation of a new asphalt base, repair
of broken concrete curbs, parking lot crack sealing, and other nonperiodic, nonscheduled work orders are considered taxable repairs. Additionally, the judge determined that the bond costs associated with the
contract should be prorated proportionately between taxable and nontaxable costs.
In Hearing No. 36,375, the Administrative Hearings section failed in its
attempt to classify the costs to build a new roof that created additional,
usable cubic footage to the building as taxable remodeling. 34 By raising
the roof on its processing plant, the taxpayer was able to accommodate
taller processing equipment. This fact was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the additional footage be usable. However, the installation of a new HVAC system in the same processing plant was held to be
taxable remodeling since the new HVAC system cooled the entire plant
and not just the new footage.
In this new digital economy, the taxation of computer and internet related assets and services arises in numerous comptroller hearings. A re32. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,706 (Jan. 31, 1997).
33. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,888 (Jan. 18, 2000).
34. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,375 (Sep. 13, 2000).
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cent hearing on the taxability of software contains a discussion of the
application of use tax to computer software.3 5 In this hearing, the taxpayer owned separate entities that provided mobile telephone services to
various areas in the United States. In 1995, the taxpayer agreed to license
software from another entity to assist in customer billing. The software
was to be used in one location within Texas and one location outside of
Texas, with special software configurations required for each location.
The software was shipped to Texas for testing, with such testing a condition of the purchase. The software was retained after the testing was
complete. The administrative law judge held that even though the
software was purchased out of state, the testing of the software in Texas
constituted a taxable use of the software in Texas. Another issue raised
in this hearing relates to proper rate of MTA taxes imposed on sales. If
the taxable sale is delivered from one MTA area to another area with its
own MTA, the MTA of the delivery destination is imposed. 36 However,
if the taxable sale is delivered from an MTA area to another area that
does not have an applicable MTA, the MTA of the origination location is
imposed. 37 Because the taxpayer failed to prove that delivery was made
into another MTA area, the origination MTA rate applied to the transactions of the taxpayer.
According to a letter ruling analyzing computer-related services, a business that provides advertising banners on its website for a fee is considered to be providing taxable data processing services. 38 However, the
comptroller considers any charges for audio and video commercials
shown on the website to be taxable telecommunications services. The
comptroller also noted that the local tax due is based on the rate applicable to the location of the server and that TIF charges of 1.25 percent are
payable on such charges. Additionally, the letter explains that if such
telecommunications services originate outside of Texas, they are exempt
under section 151.323 of the Texas Tax Code.
The comptroller's office has classified digitally downloadable music as
tangible personal property subject to sales tax on the grounds that "the
downloaded music causes a physical change to the medium on which it is
stored." 39 Thus, according to this letter ruling, digitally downloaded music "can be measured and is tangible personal property. '40 The letter
concludes that digital products, such as photographs and music, are tangi35. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,957 (Dec. 20, 1999).

36. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.424(b)(3) (West 2000).
37. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.424(b)(1) (West 2000).
38. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200006436L (June 28, 2000). This ruling is
arguably incorrect, as the "true essence" of the transaction is advertising. Moreover, Texas
remains one of the few states that continues to impose sales tax on data processing and
information services. Note that following the 1999 legislative changes, twenty percent of
such services are exempt from sales tax in Texas. Further efforts are likely to be made to
reduce or eliminate this tax in coming sessions of the Texas legislature.
39. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200005359L (May 30, 2000).
40. Id. It is unclear whether a Texas court would accept the comptroller's interpretation, and the comptroller intends to request new statutory language to support the agency
position.
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ble personal property. Thus, the purchase of a digital CD over the Internet is, according to the comptroller, taxable.
The comptroller also issued a letter that provides a current update of
the taxability of various computer and website related transactions. 41 In
this letter ruling, the analysis of the taxability of computer virus cleaning
services is interesting. The taxability of such services range from taxable
data processing services or sale and installation of software to nontaxable
software modification.
In one of many hearings interpreting the manufacturing exemption, the
taxpayer requested a refund of sales tax under the exemption for baking
pan glazing and repair. 42 The taxpayer in this hearing based its claim on
the analogy that the use of the pan glaze is similar to lubricants consumed
in the operation of manufacturing equipment, which are exempt under
section 151.318(a)(2) of the Texas Tax Code and comptroller Rule
3.300(d)(3)(A). 43 Based on a prior ruling,44 the administrative law judge
maintained that the glazing performed by a third party is a taxable repair
service. However, the administrative law judge awarded the taxpayer a
reduction in tax under section 151.3111. 45 Because the purchase of baking pans is eligible for the phased-in reduction in sales tax under section
151.318(g) and (h), 46 the administrative law judge found that repairs to
such pans qualify for the related exemption under section 151.3111. 47 In
reaching this holding, the administrative law judge overruled a prior decision 48 to the extent it conflicted with the current decision.
During the Survey period, returnable water bottles used by the taxpayer to package its products were found to be subject to tax when purchased. 49 Additionally, the comptroller has determined that paper towels
used by meat-processor employees are not considered to be taxable hand
tools under Tax Code section 151.138 but rather are exempt as materials
50
necessary to comply with public health requirements.
The comptroller issued opinions on a variety of other topics during the
Survey period, including the following interesting rulings.
The lease of an airplane by a Delaware taxpayer to a Texas taxpayer
that results in the sales tax being calculated on the price of the lease
41. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200001990L (Jan. 18, 2000).
42. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,457 (Dec. 6, 1999).
43. TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2001); 34 TEX. ADMIN.

CODE § 3.300 (West 2000).
44. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,084A (Feb. 26, 1998) (holding that pan
glazing is taxable repair).
45. 34 TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3111 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
46. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(g), (h) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
47. Note the decision's discussion of "partial exemption" versus "reduction of tax."
48. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,861 (June 30, 1997).
49. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,698 (July 18, 2000). After lengthy analysis
of the relevant Tax Code provisions and comptroller rules, the administrative law judge in
this case recommended that 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.314(b)(1) be amended to clarify

that such returnable containers are not exempt from tax.
50. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 39,327 (Aug. 30, 2000) (interpreting Tax
Code section 151.318 and 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.300(a)(6), (d)(3)(B)).
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under the Tax Code section 151.007,51 as opposed to the purchase price of
the airplane, is not considered a sham solely because it lowers a taxpayer's taxes. 52 Consequently, in a recent hearing under these facts, the
comptroller held that tax should be assessed only on the negotiated lease
price, regardless of the fact that the airplane was delivered to the lessee in
Texas. The comptroller also confirmed her position in finding that long
term leases entered into before October 1, 1995 are not eligible for an
exemption from sales tax under Rule 3.300(e) 53 since a lease is treated as
a single sale on the date the lease is executed as opposed to a series of
54
mini-sales.
In order to be considered a tax-exempt service purchased for resale,
the service must be transferred by the purchaser as an integral part of a
taxable service. 5 5 Thus, in a hearing regarding the resale exemption, the
taxpayer's purchase of "residential or nonresidential grounds cleaning"
services were not considered qualified purchases for resale since such services were not included in the garbage collection services offered by the
56
taxpayer.
Recent taxpayer challenges to the 1991 amendment to Rule 3.356,
which relates to property management companies, on the basis of legisla57
tive acceptance were rejected in comptroller hearings.
Decision 31,77058 is a significant case that focuses on the circumstances
in which construction pursuant to a contract between a contractor and a
non-exempt entity with respect to real property owned by the exempt
entity will be eligible for exemption. The administrative law judge correctly concluded that tangible personal property used in hangar construction at a municipal airport, including construction of hangars pursuant to
lump-sum contract, is exempt under section 151.311. 59 As in effect at the
time, this section exempted tangible personal property used in the performance of a contract to improve realty for, among others, a city,
county, special district or other political subdivisions of Texas. The airport at issue in this hearing was public property. While the hangars benefited the airline that paid for their construction, they were not used
exclusively to benefit the airline and, as the taxpayer proved, contributed
to the safety and efficiency of the airport generally. The tax division had
argued that the construction failed to satisfy the comptroller's requirement that construction had a primary public purpose. The taxpayer had
51. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.007 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
52. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,128 (Sept. 14, 2000).
53. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.300 (West 2000).
54. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 39,270 (Aug. 31, 2000).
55. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.356(c)(2) (West 2000).
56. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,707 (Aug. 23, 2000).
57. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,795A (Aug. 3, 2000); Tex. Comp. Pub.
Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,069 (Dec. 15, 1999).
58. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,770 (Dec. 17, 1999). The comptroller will
likely address tax-exempt contracts in the long-awaited (and still not issued) revisions to 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.291, relating to contractors.
59. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.311 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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argued that there was no public purpose requirement in section 151.311,
and that if such a requirement existed, the airport construction qualified.
Because the administrative law judge concluded that the hangar construction served a public purpose, he noted that he did not need to address the
taxpayer's contention that the statute does not require a public purpose.
The tax division conceded that tangible personal property transferred
pursuant to separated contracts is exempt.
And on an end note to the sales tax rulings discussion, if you want to
get a tax-free cookie on your next shopping trip to the mall, look for the
60
cookie store that is not in the food court and that doesn't have seating.
C.

REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS

As expected following the flurry of legislation from the 1999 Session of
the Texas Legislature, the comptroller's office was busy amending the
rules relating to the sales and use tax provisions.
Rule 3.252,61 Collection and Allocation of County Tax, was amended
to add a provision for the clothing and footwear exemption, 62 which provides that such sales are exempt for county tax purposes during the sales
tax holiday unless such exemption is repealed by the commissioners court
63
of a county.
In Rules 3.253,64 3.37565 and 3.425,66 a provision was added stating that
a retailer who has been engaged in business in a county, city, or authority
remains responsible for collecting use tax on sales made for 12 months
67
after ceasing to be engaged in business in the county, city, or authority.
These rules were also modified to conform to the changes in Rule 3.286
requiring a physical presence in the authority for imposition of the tax to
apply.6 8
The rule relating to auditing taxpayer records, Rule 3.282,69 was
60. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,053 (Jul 19, 2000) (holding that since
the taxpayer's lease included provisions related to the inclusion of the cookie store in the
food court area, taxpayer's sales of cookies in quantities of five or less are taxable under
Tax Code section 151.314 and 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.293(a)(9)). This ruling is a corollary of Texas' long time "six doughnut" rule which treats doughnuts purchased in quantities of five or less as purchased for immediate consumption and therefore taxable. See Tex
Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 8804L0880E10 (Apr. 1, 1988).
61. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.2520) (West 2000).
62. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.326 (Vernon Supp. 2001).

63. 25 Tex. Reg. 5913-15 (2000) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.252).
64. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.253(a)(i) (West 2000).
65. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.375(a)(1) (West 2000).
66. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.425(a)(2) (West 2000).

67. 24 Tex. Reg. 12016-17 (1999), adopted 25 Tex. Reg. 6775-76 (2000) (to be codified
as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.253); 24 Tex. Reg. 12023-24 (1999), adopted
25 Tex. Reg. 6776 (2000) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN CODE
§ 3.375); 24 Tex. Reg. 12024-25 (1999), adopted 25 Tex. Reg. 6776 (2000) (to be codified as
an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.425).
68. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.286(a)(1)(G) (West 2000).
69. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.282 (West 2000).
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amended to provide guidance on managed audits. 70 There are now definitions describing managed audits as well as the percentage-based reporting method. 71 Also included are factors used to determine if a taxpayer is
72
authorized to participate in a managed audit.
Rule 3.29373 was amended to reflect an increase in the exemption for
certain foods sold through bulk vending machines. Clarifications were
also made relating to nontaxable employee meals and certain catering
74
changes.
Rule 3.29575 was largely rewritten to reflect the changes made to the
Tax Code section 151.317 in 1999.76 As amended, this rule now reflects
the comptroller's long-standing policy of using the predominant use test
to determine the taxability of gas or electricity measured through a single
meter that is used for both exemption and taxable purposes. The comptroller also clarified through amendment that natural gas and electricity
77
used to operate equipment permanently affixed to realty is exempt.
Changes were made to Rule 3.29978 to reflect the 1999 amendment to
Tax Code section 151.132, which added audio tape, videotape and computer disk to the definition of exempt writings that are published and
79
distributed by qualifying not-for-profit organizations.
Rule 3.310,80 relating to laundry, cleaning and garment services, was
amended to clarify that services such as cleaning, laundering, repairing,
treating or applying protective chemicals to items in a disaster area are
included in the types of labor exempt from tax.81 The exemption under
this Rule was also amended to include restoration of real property, as
82
well as tangible personal property.
Modifications were made to Rule 3.322,83 which governs the treatment
of exempt organizations, to clarify the statutory provision that allows certain organizations to hold two one-day, tax-free sales per year.84 In light
of several Texas' cities bid to host the Olympic Games in 2012, this Rule
70. 25 Tex. Reg. 2296-98 (2000), adopted 25 Tex. Reg. 9219-20 (2000) (to be codified as
an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.282).
71. Id.
72. Id.

73. 34

TEX. ADMIN. CODE

§ 3.293 (West 2000).

74. 25 Tex. Reg. 6147-50 (2000) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.293).
75. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.295 (West 2000).
76. 25 Tex. Reg. 9220-222 (2000) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.295).
77. Id.
78. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.299 (West 2000).
79. 24 Tex. Reg. 12017-18 (1999), adopted 25 Tex. Reg. 3289 (2000) (to be codified as
an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.299).
80. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.310 (West 2000).
81. 24 Tex. Reg. 12018-19 (2000), adopted 25 Tex. Reg. 6776 (2000) (to be codified as
an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.310).
82. Id.
83. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.322 (West 2000).
84. 24 Tex. Reg. 12019-20 (1999), adopted 25 Tex. Reg. 5915 (2000) (to be codified as
an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.322).
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was also modified to include certain exempt, local organizing committees
that are pursuing selection of their city as the host site for the 2007 Pan
Games to the list of entities that
American Games or the 2012 Olympic
85
may qualify for exempt status.
The amendments to Rule 3.32386 relate to the provision of refunds on
imports and exports. 87 The new rule provides that retailers in counties
bordering the United Mexican States must wait 24 hours from the documented time of export before issuing a refund of tax paid. 88 For all other
retailers, the waiting period is seven days. 89 Rule 3.36090 was amended to
refer Custom Brokers to Rule 3.323(e) for information regarding the
treatment of a request for refund of tax on exports. 91
The 1999 Texas legislature enacted new Tax Code section 151.351 to
provide an exemption for 20 percent of the value of data processing and
information services, effective on October 1, 1999.92 An early draft ver93
sion of the revisions to the rule related to data processing, Rule 3.330,
indicated that the exemption would not apply to services provided pursuant to a contract that was entered into prior to October 1, 1999. However, the comptroller's staff has since concluded (correctly) that the
exemption applies to services provided on or after October 1, 1999, without regard to the date of the underlying contract, if any. This result is
confirmed by the new and improved version of Rule 3.330, proposed on
June 23, 2000 and adopted effective August 24, 2000. 9 4 As adopted, the
rule provides that the exemption "applies to services performed on or
''95
after October 1, 1999.

Rule 3.34296 was amended to reflect changes made relating to information services. 97 It was proposed and adopted at the same time as the data
processing rule and also confirms the October 1, 1999 effective date for
the twenty percent exemption.9 8 Spokespersons with the comptroller's
office have also confirmed orally that both data processing and information services, if purchased for resale, will continue to be exempt under the
85. Id.
86. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.323 (West 2000).

87. 24 Tex. Reg. 12020 (1999), adopted 25 Tex. Reg. 5915 (2000) (to be codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE

§ 3.323).

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §3.360(b) (West 2000).
91. 24 Tex. Reg. 12022 (1999), adopted 25 Tex. Reg. 5915-16 (2000) (to be codified as
an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.360).
92. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.351 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
93. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.330 (West 2000).
94. 25 Tex. Reg. 6076 (2000), adopted 25 Tex. Reg. 8048 (2000) (to be codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.330).
95. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.330 (West 2000).
96. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.342 (West 2000).
97. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.006 (Vernon Supp. 2001); 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3,285 (West 2000).
98. Id.
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resale exemption. 99 This result is justified not only by the fact that eighty
percent of the services are subject to tax but also by the fact that the
services are classified as "taxable services," notwithstanding the
exemption.
Rule 3.344,100 Telecommunication Services, was amended to reflect the

1999 Tax Code amendment removing prepaid calling cards from the definition of telecommunications services. 10 1 Also excluded from telecommunications services, pursuant to the 1999 Tax Code amendment to
section 151.0103, was Internet access services. 10 2 In addition, the definitions of Internet and Internet Access Service were also added to revised
Rule 3.344.103

The comptroller issued Rule 3.365 to replace the expired emergency
rule 10 4 issued in 1999 regarding the sales tax holiday in August of every
year.' 0 5 Since this revised rule was written following the first sales tax
holiday in 1999, many of the issues that arose in the initial holiday were
addressed in this final rule. Rule 3.372106 was amended in 2000 to reflect
local taxing authorities' option to repeal the local tax portion of the sales
annual three-day sales tax holiday for
tax exemptions, provided under0 the
7
certain clothing and footwear.
A new rule, Rule 3.366, relating to Internet Access services was added
in 2000.108 This new rule is designed to implement the 1999 legislative
changes that defined Internet access service and reflects the new $25 per
month exemption. 10 9 The rule also provides guidance on the use of resale
certificates for such services, allocations based on service benefit locations and allocations for local tax purposes." 0
Rule 3.378,1' relating to municipal sales and use tax on natural gas and
electricity, was amended to reflect changes to Tax Code section 151.317,
which codified the comptroller's long-standing policy relating to the "pre99. See 25 Tex. Reg. 6078 (2000), adopted 25 Tex. Reg. 8049 (2000) (to be codified as
§ 3.342).
100. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.344 (West 2000).

an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE

101. 24 Tex. Reg. 12020 (1999), adopted 25 Tex. Reg. 3289 (2000) (to be codified as an
amendment to 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.344); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0103 (Vernon

Supp. 2001).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 24 Tex. Reg. 5277-79 (1999) (emerg. rule 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.365) (adopted
July 16, 1999, expired Nov. 2, 1999) (Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts).
105. 25 Tex. Reg. 6474 (2000), adopted 25 Tex. Reg. 8740 (2000) (to be codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.365).
106. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.372(i) (West 2000).

107. 24 Tex. Reg. 12022-23 (1999), adopted 25 Tex. Reg. 5916 (2000) (to be codified as
an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.372). To date only the City of Sunset Valley

in Travis county has elected not to participate in the sales tax holiday pursuant to this
provision.
108. 25 Tex. Reg. 6080 (2000), adopted 25 Tex. Reg. 9013 (2000) (to be codified at 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.366).
109. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.325 (Vernon Supp. 2001).

110. 25 Tex. Reg. 6080 (2000), adopted 25 Tex. Reg. 9013 (2000) (to be codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.366).
111. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.378 (West 2000).
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dominant use" test 1u 2 for natural gas and electricity measured through a

single meter.1 1 3 Also, reference in this rule to a one percent local tax was
removed since municipalities have imposed varying rates of tax under this
section. 114 The provisions of this rule relating to the reimposition of tax
were clarified, 115 and the provision for continuation of taxation was revised to clarify that the requirements of this provision must have been
satisfied in 1979.116

There were also a few proposed rules not yet enacted during the Survey period. An amendment to Rule 3.316,117 relating to occasional sales,

was proposed in September, 2000 to reflect changes made regarding taxfree sales of items over $5000 by certain organizations.' 1 8 The proposed
amendment also adds a provision relating to the tax-exempt adoption of
animals from nonprofit animal shelters and deletes the provision requiring college and university organizations to re-certify their status every
two years.1 19
The proposed amendments to Rule 3.302120 were made largely to reflect statutory changes related to accounting for debt deductions and receipt of interest on erroneously paid sales tax made in the 1999 legislative
12
session. 1
Proposed Rule 3.292, Repair, Remodeling, Maintenance and Restoration of Tangible Personal Property, adds provisions related to exemptions
allowed under Tax Code section 151.3111122 for certain services that were
not previously enumerated in the rule. 123 This rule is also being amended
to clarify that labor to repair, remodel, maintain or restore clothing or
footwear purchased during the three day sales tax holiday remains sub1 24
ject to taxation.
The comptroller's office also proposed a new Rule 3.1261 to provide
guidance relating to reports, payments and record keeping requirements
125
for oyster sales fees.
112. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.295 (West 2000).
113. 25 Tex. Reg. 7775-76 (2000) (to be codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE

§ 3.378).

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.316 (West 2000).
118. 25 Tex. Reg. 9192 (2000) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.316) (proposed Sep. 15, 2000); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.310, 151.312
(Vernon Supp. 2001).
119. 25 Tex. Reg. 9192-95 (2000) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.316) (proposed Sep. 15, 2000).
120. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.302 (West 2000).
121. 25 Tex. Reg. 9190-92 (2000) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.302) (proposed Sep. 15, 2000); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.426, 111.064
(Vernon Supp. 2001).
122. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.311 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
123. 25 Tex. Reg. 9187-90 (2000) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.292) (proposed Sep. 15, 2000).
124. Id.
125. 25 Tex. Reg. 9195 (2000) (to be codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.126(1) (proposed Sep. 15, 2000); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 436.103 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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FRANCHISE TAX

APPLICATION OF THE TAX

Rylander v. Bandag Licensing Corp.126 surprised many tax practitioners. This interesting franchise tax case involved a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bandag Corporation. During the audit period in question, the
subsidiary possessed a certificate of authority to do business in Texas but
did not own, possess, use or maintain any real property or tangible property in Texas. The facts showed that the subsidiary, BLC, owned three
patents that were licensed to Bandag under a 1985 agreement executed
by Bandag and BLC outside Texas. Pursuant to that agreement, Bandag
sent royalty payments to BLC's Iowa office; however, the comptroller's
policy during the audit period provided that the licensing of such intangibles did not create franchise tax nexus. Instead, the comptroller
sought to impose franchise tax solely because of BLC's certificate of authority. Noting that the franchise tax extends "only 'to the limits of the
1 27
United States Constitution and the Federal law adopted' thereunder, 128
the court turned to the traditional Complete Auto Transit,Inc. v. Brady
Commerce Clause analysis. Accordingly, the court examined whether
the tax is applied to an activity with substantial nexus, fairly apportioned,
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to
the services provided by the state. Concluding that BLC was not physically present in Texas (and therefore would not have had sales/use tax
nexus under Quill Corp.129) and that BLC's holding the certificate of authority failed to constitute "an activity" in the ordinary sense of the definition, the court concluded that when a corporation, like BLC, conducts
its activities "solely through interstate commerce and lacked any physical
presence in the state, no sufficient nexus exists to permit the state to assess tax."'1 30 In addition to holding that the comptroller's franchise tax
claim against BLC fails under the Commerce Clause, the court additionally concluded that BLC's "passive possession of the Certificate of Authority to do business in Texas" standing alone provides insufficient
131
contact under the Due Process Clause to subject BLC to jurisdiction.
At the trial, the comptroller had requested an additional finding of fact
that BLC's reported business activities in Texas included receiving royalties from Bandag for one of the years at issue. However, because the trial
judge denied that request and because the comptroller had not complained on appeal that such denial was in error, the Court of Appeals
decision did not discuss the royalty issue in depth. The case also presents
important procedural issues regarding the Uniform Declaratory Judg126. 18 S.W.3d 296 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. filed.).
127. Id. at 298 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001(c) (Vernon Supp. 2001)) (emphasis added).
128. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
129. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 292 (1992).
130. Bandag, 18 S.W.3d at 300.
131. Id. at 301.
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ment Act and attorneys' fees. 132

B.

ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS AND LETTERS

Decision 36,304A 133 again highlights the difficulty of determining with
certainty how receipts from a trust will be sourced for Texas franchise tax
purposes. The taxpayer in this case asserted that the proceeds from the
disposition of the assets of the trusts should be treated as non-Texas receipts because the payor of the proceeds was a Delaware corporation.
The evidence showed that the parties had entered into a series of documents, including a Participation Agreement, an Owner-Trust Agreement,
a Tax Indemnity Agreement, and other agreements typically used in certain financing/lease-back transactions. As is typical in such transactions,
the Owner Trustee held legal title to the property (in this case, property
related to a chemical company plant complex). During the audit period,
the parties had executed a "Termination Agreement." For franchise tax
purposes, the administrative law judge considered whether the petitioner
had (as it claimed) transferred its interest in the trust. A comptroller
letter issued to the taxpayer a month after the Termination Agreement
provided that a distribution through the trust would not be treated as
Texas gross receipts. (The letter had been issued in response to the taxpayer's question as to whether gain realized from the sale or exchange of
securities by the trust would be treated as Texas gross receipts.) Although the taxpayer ultimately prevailed in this case and was able to treat
the receipts as non-Texas receipts, perhaps the more interesting part of
this decision is its extensive discussion of the comptroller's treatment
over the years of distributions from a trust.
The administrative law judge found, as a matter of fact, that until September 1994, when an internal memorandum recommended that distributions from a trust should be apportioned based on the "principalplace of
business of the trust" (legal domicile of trust) for earned surplus purposes,
there had been no consistent policy in place regarding trust distributions
for taxable earned surplus purposes.134 In December 1996, Rule 3.557135
was revised to provide that distributions to beneficiaries of a trust are
apportioned based on a legal domicile of the trust. As the administrative
law judge noted, the comptroller's policy in effect in 1992 was to source
trust distributions based on the state of trust formation or the legal domicile of the trustee. Indeed, the administrative law judge notes that an internal comptroller letter written in September 1994 acknowledged that
there were four inconsistent trust distribution sourcing policies in the
comptroller's office at that time. In this case, the tax division attempted
unsuccessfully to apply its then current (2000) interpretation to an old
132. Id. at 301-04. The award of attorney fees also presents interesting possibilities for
taxpayers. See infra note 281 and accompanying text.
133. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,304A (April 25, 2000).
134. Id.
135. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.557 (West 2000).
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(1992) fact pattern. Interestingly, the tax division also argued in this case
that the "legal domicile" of the trust is determined by the location of the
trust's "day-to-day activities, which, in [this] case, would be determined
by the location of the assets."' 136 After tracking through a history of several decisions (not always consistent), the administrative law judge recommended that the trust distributions at issue in this particular case be
apportioned based on the location of the payor test and that the location
of the payor test should be based upon the "legal domicile of the trusts."
Under the facts at issue, the administrative law judge concluded that the
legal domicile was "the principal place of business, the location of the
trustee."
A letter ruling issued a few months prior to Decision 36304A 137 also
involved trusts utilized for non-recourse financing to purchase large assets that were then leased to a lessee. For federal income tax purposes,
these grantor trust leases were treated as true leases, i.e., leases in which
the trust was treated as the asset owner. For GAAP purposes, however,
the taxpayer, which was a Delaware corporation that was the beneficiary
of the trust, did not record the cost of the underlying asset or the nonrecourse debt on its ledger. Instead, it reported its net out-of-pocket investment in the underlying assets (i.e., its equity) as lease receivables.
The letter discusses seven separate trusts, some formed under Texas law,
some under Connecticut law, some with a Texas trustee, and others with a
Connecticut trustee. In determining how the distributions to beneficiaries from the trust would be apportioned, the letter concludes that the
apportionment will be based on "the legal domicile of the trust. ' 138 By
cross-reference to section 3.549(b)(6), a trust's legal domicile is defined as
the trust's "principal place of business," i.e., "the location of its day-today operations."' 39 Three of the trusts held office buildings as their assets. The letter concludes that, in these three cases, the location of the
office building is the location of the day-to-day operations of the trust,
apparently without regard to the law under which the trust was established or the location of the trustee.
Several decisions focused on "throw back" rules, pursuant to which
sales receipts are "thrown back" to Texas for franchise tax purposes when
the taxpayer has no nexus with the state to which the receipts would otherwise be sourced.
Decision 38,716140 focused on the taxpayer's claim that it had nexus
through property and payroll in each of several other states, so that its
sales under those states should not be thrown back to Texas for franchise
tax purposes. Although the taxpayer stored inventory in some other
states, the evidence showed that its inventory storage consisted of storing
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,304A.
Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 9910264L (Oct. 18, 1999).
Id. (citing 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549(e)(47) (West 2000)).
34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549(b)(6) (West 2000).
Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,716 (June 15, 2000).

2001]

TAXATION

1611

perishable food items for only a short period of time in rented locations
when customers cancelled orders. The comptroller concluded that this
situation constituted nothing more than a necessary delay in transit, so
that-under the terms of Rule 3.557(e)(37)(G) 141-it did not result in
nexus. Although the taxpayer contended that it had property and payroll
in several other states, the comptroller concluded that the taxpayer had
failed to provide adequate documentation or evidence to support this
contention.
In Decision 38,309,142 the taxpayer manufactured and sold plastic laminate.' 4 3 The taxpayer asserted that it was not required to throw back
receipts from sale of tangible personal property that it delivered to nonTexas destination states with its own trucks. The tax division ultimately
agreed with this assertion as to taxable capital. However, the tax division
disagreed with the taxpayer's assertion that it was not required to throw
back receipts for earned surplus purposes when it sold and shipped tangible personal property from Texas to other destination states with whom it
had constitutional nexus but not nexus for tax of "a like-kind" to the
earned surplus. The taxpayer essentially argued that the standard for
both taxable capital and earned surplus is identical, so that the taxpayer
should not be subject, for earned surplus purposes, to a throw back rule
with regard to those states. 144 As the administrative law judge points out,
the validity of the comptroller's rule on this point has been confirmed (by
the comptroller anyway) by Decision No. 35,480 (1998). 145 However, as
the administrative law judge noted, litigation is pending on this issue.
Another issue not specifically addressed by the comptroller decision is a
statute of limitations one; the tax division conceded that the taxpayer's
franchise tax refund claim had been made within six months of the date
the tax assessment became final. However, the tax division indicated that
if the taxpayer's claim were expanded to "transactions" not included in
the audit, the tax division would then insist that the claim with respect to
these other transactions was subject to the four-year statute of limitations
rather than to the later, six-months after final assessment.
As telecommunication issues continue to proliferate, it is not surprising
to find telecommunication receipts cases. Decision 36,385146 addressed
the contention of a Texas corporation operating as an independent local
exchange telephone company ("LEC") that its apportioned gross receipts
should not include revenues from access charges and billing and collection charges to long distance carriers and any user charges to the taxpayer's customers. Noting that Rule 3.557 provides that revenues for
141. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.557(e)(37)(G) (West 2000).
142. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,309 (Jan. 6, 2000).
143. Anyone remember the old movie The Graduate?
144. As part of this argument, the taxpayer asserted that the legislature's substantive
amendment to section 171.1032(a) of the Tax Code applied to reports due after January 1,
1994, but not to earlier reports.
145. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,480 (July 7, 1998).
146. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,385 (Oct. 29, 1999).
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telephone calls in Texas are Texas receipts, "except for revenues from calls
in interstate commerce,"'1 47 the taxpayer asserted that its interstate access
charges, interstate billing and collection charges, and interstate end users
charges were all "revenues from calls in interstate commerce," and therefore not Texas receipts. The tax division replied that the quoted language
had been included in the rule since December 30, 1987 and that thereafter, the United States Supreme Court decision of Goldberg v. Sweet 148
had eased the constitutional restraints on including receipts from interstate services in the Texas Tax Code. In other words, relying on Tax Code
section 101.002(b), 149 the tax division asserted that because the constitutional interpretation had changed, the comptroller was authorized to
change its interpretation (regardless of the fact that the rule had not
changed). The Proposed Comptroller Decision recommended that the
interstate access charges be deleted from gross receipts; however, following the tax division's exceptions, the comptroller decided to agree with
the tax division. Thus, the final Comptroller Decision concludes that the
interstate access charges are Texas receipts "because they represent payments for access to local networks or the use of local facilities.' 50 Moreover, finding that the contested charges were includable not because of a
change in the comptroller's interpretation but because the receipts were
held not to be receipts from interstate calls, the comptroller also ruled
against the taxpayer's detrimental reliance arguments. The administrative law judge did waive interest for a portion of the time because the
length of time that elapsed between the closing of the record and the
decision.
Fortunately, ruling letters continue to be somewhat more favorable to
taxpayers in the franchise tax area than are the bulk of the franchise tax
redetermination and refund hearings. Most crucially, the letters offer additional planning certainty for taxpayers who desire to know, prior to the
completion of their transaction, what the tax impact will be.
An October 1999 letter, 15 ' for example, addressed the sourcing of receipts in connection with the sale of communication equipment containing both integrated circuits and stand-alone software. The stand-alone
software contains both operating and applications software, and the applications software is customized. The customer pays a separate right-touse fee and receives a non-exclusive license to use the software. There is
no licensing fee for the software embedded in the chips, although there is
a separate licensing fee for the software installed on the circuit. The
comptroller indicated that if separate licenses are issued for the stand147. 34

TEX. ADMIN. CODE

§ 3.557 (West 2000) (emphasis added).

148. 488 U.S. 252 (1989).

149.

TEX. TAX CODE ANN.

§ 101.002(b) (Vernon 1992) (that all-time favorite section

providing that "the jurisdiction and authority of the state to determine the subject and
object of taxation shall extend to the limits of the then-current interpretation of the Texas
Constitution and United States Constitution and laws").
150. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,385 (Oct. 29, 1999) (emphasis added).
151. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 9910028L (Oct. 28, 1999).
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alone software and the software installed on a circuit, the receipts attributable to software licenses would be apportioned based on the location of
payor. The receipts attributable to sale of the software embedded on the
chips and the sale of equipment would then be apportioned as sales of
tangible personal property.
Another interesting letter 152 focused on the contribution of property
by a Texas corporation to a limited liability company treated as a partnership for federal tax purposes, in exchange for interest in the LLC. At the
time the property was contributed to the LLC, it had a cost-basis of
$1,000 and a fair market value of $600,000. The contributed property is
subject to the provisions of Internal Revenue Code 15 3 concerning built-in
gains. Relying on Rule 3.562(c) 1 54 which provides for the computation of

an LLC's taxable capital, and Article 5.01(a) of the Texas Limited Liability Company Act, 155 the comptroller concluded that the member's contribution is the sum of the cash contributed and "the agreed value" of the
contributed property in computing its taxable capital.
C.

REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS

The comptroller issued a draft version of Rule 3.557156 and Rule
3.549,157 dealing with taxable capital apportionment. The amendments to

Rule 3.557 include definitions of the Internal Revenue Code with respect
to dates, a definition of legal domicile, and definition of location of payor.
The rule also adopts changes with respect to regulated investment companies and provides that a corporation with a 52-53 week accounting year
(such as certain retailers) ending in the first four days of January during
the year in which the report is originally due may use the preceding December 31 as the date through which taxable earned surplus is computed.
The rule also includes a provision that gross receipts related to income
described under section 171.1061 of the Tax Code 158 should not be included in either gross receipts or Texas gross receipts for apportionment
purposes. In addition, there were several other changes to the rule, including an amendment with respect to natural gas production and a new
provision providing that distributions to the beneficiaries of a trust are
apportioned to the legal domicile of the trust.
Shortly after the current Survey period, the comptroller proposed
changes to Rule 3.549.159 As the preamble to the rule points out, the rule
has been amended to provide a new apportionment requirement for dividends and/or interest received by banking corporations to reflect changes
152. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Letter No. 200001284L (Jan. 18, 2000).

153. 26 U.S.C.A. § 704(c) (West 2001).
154. TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.562(c) (West 2000).
155. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n (Vernon 1997).
156. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.557.
157. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549.
158. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1061 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
159. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.549 (West 2000).
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in the law. 160 Other changes address qualified employer retirement plans
and a series of clarifications. An amendment to subsection (e)(28) is being proposed to add magazines to the provision addressing advertising
revenues in order to clarify that other receipts of newspapers and
magazines must be apportioned in accordance with the general rules set
61
forth in this rule.1
The comptroller also revised Rule 3.560162 to take into account the
changes made during the 1999 legislative session, including a revised definition of "banking corporation" and to provide that for reports originally
due on or after January 1, 2000, a banking corporation's dividend and/or
interest are apportioned to the legal domicile of the payor. 163 The rule
also includes a definition of legal domicile.1 64 Other rule changes included the rule on enterprise zones and defense economic zones1 65 and
savings and loan associations.1 66 Like banks, savings and loan associations are subject to new rules for dividends and interest following the
1999 legislative changes.
III.
A.

PROPERTY TAX

APPLICATION OF THE TAX/EXEMPTIONS

Some of the more noteworthy decisions issued during the Survey period involved property tax arrangements that are used as vehicles by local
jurisdictions to spur economic development, such as tax abatement agreements, tax increment financing and economic development agreements.
The message from these decisions is unambiguous-radical departures
from the statutory requirements (as interpreted by the Attorney General)
for the particular incentive can result in the loss of incentive.
In Letter Opinion JC-0300,167 the Attorney General ruled that a tax
abatement agreement entered into by the lessee of the property instead
of the owner of the property is not valid.' 68 The abatement agreement at
160. 25 Tex. Reg. 12627-32 (2000) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN.
§ 3.549) (proposed Dec. 22, 2000).
161. Id. If adopted in its proposed form, the rule would provide that all advertising
revenue, including that from out of state advertisements of a newspaper or magazine that
transacts "its primary business activities within Texas" are Texas receipts, and that all other
receipts are apportioned in accordance with the apportion rules otherwise applicable.
162. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §3.560 (West 2000).
163. 25 Tex. Reg. 555 (2000), adopted 25 Tex. Reg. 6151 (2000) (to be codified as an
amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN CODE § 3.560).
164. Id. (providing that the legal domicile of a corporation is its state of incorporation;
that the legal domicile of a partnership or trust is its principle place of business; and that
the principle place of business of a partnership or trust is the location of its "day-to-day
operations"; further providing that where the day-to-day operations are conducted equally
or fairly evenly in more than one state, the commercial domicile will be considered the
principle place of business).
165. 24 Tex. Reg. 10832-33 (1999), adopted 25 Tex. Reg. 2155-56 (2000) (to be codified
as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.561).
166. 25 Tex. Reg. 556 (2000) (to be codified as an amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.563).
167. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0300 (Oct. 27, 2000).
168. Id.
CODE
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issue was between Bexar County and Boeing Aerospace Operations, Inc.
("Boeing"), the lessee of the real property. 169 The agreement abated
county property taxes on Boeing's tangible personal property located at
the site, provided that Boeing made specified tangible personal property
investments on the property.' 70 In rejecting the validity of this tax abatement agreement, the Attorney General's interpretation relied on sections
312.204(a) 17 1 and 312.206(a),1 72 which state that cities and counties may
enter into tax abatement agreements with the real property owner.' 73
The Attorney General rejected the argument that a lessee of real property is an owner of the leased real property for these purposes. 174
Two Attorney General opinions addressed the requirement in the tax
abatement statute that property that is owned or leased by a member of
the municipality's governing body is not eligible for tax abatement by the
municipality. Letter Opinions JC-0155175 and JC-0236176 involved a circumstance in which a tax abatement agreement was granted to a corporation and subsequently the major shareholder of the corporation was
elected to the city council of the city that granted the tax abatement
agreement.' 77 The Attorney General ruled that although the major
shareholder was not barred from serving on the city council merely because his or her corporation had been granted a tax abatement, the corporation loses the tax abatement on the date the individual assumes
office as a member of the city council, 178 with taxes prorated for that year
179
based on the date he or she assumed office.
169. Id.
170. Id.

171.

TEX. TAX CODE ANN.

§ 312.204(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001).

172. Id. at § 312.206(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001). One possible way of avoiding this issue
would be for the owner of the leased property to enter into the tax abatement agreement
along with the lessee, thus satisfying the statutory requirement that the tax abatement
agreement be with the owner of the real property. There is nothing in the abatement
statute that indicates other parties besides the government entity and the real property
owner cannot be a party to the tax abatement agreement.
173. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0300 (Oct. 27, 2000).
174. Id. In McCormick Mkt'g, Inc. v. City of Colorado City, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 284
(Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, no pet.), the Eastland Court of Appeals held that a tax abatement agreement between a city and a property owner was invalid because the parties failed
to comply with the tax abatement statute in several respects, including failing to establish a
reinvestment zone in which the property is located and failing to have a written tax abatement agreement that included the specific terms that must be included under section
312.205 of the Tax Code. Id. at 3-4. The court also denied estoppel-type arguments raised
by the property owner. Id. at 4-5.
175. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0155 (Dec. 8, 1999).
176. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0236 (June 22, 2000).
177. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0155 (Dec. 8, 1999). Letter Opinion JC-0236 clarified Letter Opinion JC-0155. See Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0236 (June 22, 2000).
178. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0155 (Dec. 8,1999).

179. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0236 (June 22, 2000). In another Attorney General opinion

addressing the tax abatement statute, Letter Opinion JC-0133 addressed the 1989 statutory
amendment that changed the maximum abatement term from fifteen to ten years. Tex.
Att'y Gen. LO JC-0133 (Oct. 28, 1999). Specifically, the Letter Opinion addressed a tax
abatement agreement that was entered into one year before the 1989 amendment, providing for a five-year abatement that would automatically be extended for two additional five
year periods for a total of fifteen years, if certain employment conditions were met. Id.
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The Attorney General, in Letter Opinion JC-0092,18o ruled that section
381.004 of the Local Government Code 181 does not authorize a county to
make payments of county funds to a private company in order to spur
economic development. 182 The opinion concerned an economic development agreement (the "Dallas County Agreement") between Dallas
County and a private company owning real property in the county. 183
Pursuant to the Dallas County Agreement, Dallas County agreed, subject
to conditions, to make yearly payments to the company for a ten-year
period equal to one-half of the property taxes collected by the county on
the relevant property's incremental value from its 1996 value.1 8 4 The
conditions were that (a) the company met certain employee, payroll and
property value requirements, and (b) the Attorney General opined that
the tax abatement statute does not preclude agreements such as the one
at issue.' 85 The Dallas County Agreement provided that it is entered into
pursuant to section 381.004 of the Local Government Code, 186 which provides that, to encourage economic development, a county may develop or
administer a program for economic development or to stimulate commercial activity in the county and that a county may, inter alia, "use county
employees or funds for the program.' 87
The Attorney General first addressed whether Chapter 312 of the Tax
Code,1 88 dealing with tax abatement agreements, precludes grants and
economic development agreements of the type provided for in the Dallas
County Agreement. The primary concern was that section 312.206(a) 89
of the Tax Code, as in effect when the Dallas County Agreement was
entered into, provides that the terms of a county tax abatement must be
These employment conditions were met, thereby meaning that the owner was entitled to a
fifteen-year abatement under the terms of the abatement agreement. Id. However, the
conditions were met by a new owner of the property. Id. The Attorney General ruled that
if the original agreement was a fifteen-year agreement, then the 1989 amendment would
not operate to shorten the abatement period granted by the agreement because the 1989
legislation does not affect the validity of abatement agreement extensions granted before
the effective date of the 1989 legislation. Id. However, if the original agreement was properly treated as a five-year agreement, then the 1989 legislation would reduce the maximum
term of the abatement agreement to ten years. Id. The Attorney General considered this
to be a question of fact, which would not normally be addressed by the Attorney General.
Id. Given that the conditions to the extension of the tax abatement were outside the control of the city, it is difficult to understand how the agreement could be treated as a fiveyear agreement. Because the conditions to the extension of the tax abatement agreement
were outside the control of the city, the agreement should be viewed as a fifteen-year
agreement that is terminated early if certain conditions are not met.
180. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0092 (Aug. 11, 1999).
181. TEX. LOCAL Gov'T CODE ANN. § 381.004 (Vernon 1999).
182. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0092 (Aug. 11, 1999).
183. Id.
184. Id. This agreement essentially embodied tax increment financing-type concepts
(i.e., capturing a portion of property taxes on the property value in excess of the value
existing in a base year) without requiring that the captured taxes be used for public works.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. TEX. LOCAL Gov'T CODE ANN. § 381.004(c)(4) (Vernon 2001).
188. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 312.001 - 312.402 (Vernon 1992 and Supp. 2001).
189. Id. § 312.206(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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identical to the terms of the city agreement, with certain exceptions. 190
The Attorney General ruled that Chapter 312 is not relevant to the kind
of arrangement described in the Dallas County Agreement because the
Dallas County Agreement is not a tax abatement agreement-Chapter
312 neither authorizes nor precludes agreements like the Dallas County
Agreement. 191
The Attorney General, however, raised and answered another critical
issue-whether section 381.004 authorizes the Dallas County Agreement. 192 In concluding that the Dallas County Agreement is outside the
scope of powers granted to a county under section 381.004, the Attorney
General relied on the principle that in circumstances in which the Texas
Legislature authorizes grants, it generally expressly does so. 193 Section
381.004 provides no such express authorization; 194 thus, the Attorney
General concluded that the statute does not authorize the grant of funds
contemplated by the Dallas County Agreement. 195 Simply, the statute
does not expressly authorize a county to agree to make grants of county
funds to a private entity.
Because Dallas County relied on article III, section 52-a of the Texas
Constitution 196 for its construction of section 381.004 to allow for grants
to private companies, the Attorney General examined the relationship of
section 381.004 to this constitutional provision.' 97 Article III, section 52a provides that the Texas Legislature may "provide for the creation of
programs and the making of loans and grants of public money" for economic development and other specified economic purposes. 98 The Attorney General reasoned that this constitutional provision is not selfenacting; 99 rather it permits the Texas Legislature to enact legislation
providing for economic development. 200 The Attorney General reasoned
that where the Texas Legislature has desired to enable a governmental
entity to grant public funds to private entities under the authority of this
constitutional provision, it has expressly done so, such as in section
380.001 of the Local Government Code, which provides that municipalities may grant and loan public money for economic development. 20 ' No
such express language is present in section 381.004.
190. Id.
191. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0092 (Aug. 11, 1999).
192. Id.
193. Id. Although the wording of sections 380.001 (for municipalities) and 381.004 (for
counties) are different, query whether the Texas Legislature really intended to give municipalities broader power than counties to make grants and loans of public funds.
194. TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 381.004 (Vernon 2001).
195. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0092 (Aug. 11, 1999).
196. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 52-a.
197. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0092 (Aug. 11, 1999).
198. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 52-a.
199. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0092 (Aug. 11, 1999).
200. Id.
201. Id. Indeed, in Letter Opinion JM-185, the Attorney General indicated in 1992 that
grants and rebates by municipalities of public funds pursuant to an economic development
program established in accordance with section 380.001 of the Texas Local Government
Code are valid and constitutional. See Tex. Att'y Gen. LO DM-185 (1992).
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Letter Opinion JC-0152 20 2 addresses qualification of property for tax
increment financing. The Attorney General ruled that a tax increment
20 3
financing reinvestment zone established under section 311.005(a)(5)
must be in an "unproductive, underdeveloped or blighted" area. 20 4 Section 311.005(a) sets forth four different ways a property may be designated as a reinvestment zone. 20 5 Section 311.005(a)(5) 20 6 is different
than the other three ways property may be designated as a reinvestment
zone because it merely requires the landowner or landowners to petition
requesting that the area be designated as a reinvestment zone, 20 7 whereas
the other methods essentially require that the property be in a blighted
area. 20 8 Although section 311.005(a)(5) does not, by its terms, require
that the property designated as a reinvestment zone be in a blighted area,
the Attorney General ruled that such property must be "unproductive,
underdeveloped or blighted" because the constitutional amendment authorizing tax increment financing states that tax increment financing is to
be used for "unproductive, underdeveloped or blighted area[s]. '2 0 9 The
Attorney General further ruled that an area may not be designated as a
reinvestment zone simply because the municipality believes that greater
development will occur if the tax increment financing zone is created. 210
Finally, the Attorney General ruled that the city's determination in this
regard must be made in good faith, exercising reasonable discretion,
which is subject to judicial review. 2 11
In Letter Opinion JC-0311, 212 the Attorney General addressed
whether doctors' offices owned by a hospital district and leased to private
physicians are tax-exempt. Courts have repeatedly held that publiclyowned medical offices leased to private physicians are not tax exempt
202. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0152 (Dec. 8, 1999).
203. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 311.005(a)(5) (Vernon 1992).
204. Id.
205. The four ways are, in general, (a) if the property arrests or impairs the sound
growth of the municipality due to a variety of specific factors generally related to blighted
conditions; (b) if the property is open and because of obsolete platting, deteriorated structures, site improvements or other factors, the property impairs or arrests the sound growth
of the municipality; (c) if the property is in (or is immediately adjacent to) a federally
assisted new community; and (d) if the area is described in a petition requesting that the
area be designated as a reinvestment zone and the owners of at least 50 percent of the
value of the property in the area sign the petition. Id. § 311.004(a)(1), (2), (3) and (5).
206. Id. § 311.004(a)(5).
207. Id.
208. Id. § 311.004(a)(1), (2) and (3).
209. TEX. CONST.art. VIII, § 1-g(b).
210. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0152 (Dec. 8, 1999). In another opinion addressing tax
increment financing, the Attorney General ruled in Letter Opinion JC-1041 that a city may
not use unexpended funds with respect to a terminated tax increment financing zone to
build improvements outside the zone, as such funds must be returned pro rata to the taxing
units participating in the tax increment financing project. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-1041.
211. Although courts have the power to review actions by city governing bodies in
adopting ordinances, courts generally do not prevent the enactment of an ordinance except
upon a showing of fraud or arbitrary abuse of power. See Town of Ascarate v. Villalobos,
148 Tex. 254, 264, 223 S.W.2d 945, 950 (Tex. 1949).
212. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0311 (Nov. 30, 2000).
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under section 11.11213 of the Tax Code because the office buildings are
not used exclusively for public purposes. 214 However, the twist in the
facts of this Opinion is that each lease between the hospital district and
the physician restricts the equipment that the physician may own in order
to encourage his or her to send all patients requiring X-rays and laboratory work to the hospital district's hospital.2 15 The hospital district asserted that the offices are tax exempt because the their use increases the
hospital's income thereby benefiting the residents of the county.2 16 The
Attorney General disagreed, reasoning that the receipt by a government
entity of proceeds arising from commercial use of property does not qualify the use of the property as public. 2 17 Because the offices are not de21 8
voted exclusively to public use, they are not exempt.
The Waco Court of Appeals in Destec Properties Ltd. Partnership v.
Freestone CentralAppraisal Dist.219 held that the income approach to valuing an overriding royalty interest is not, as a matter of law, an impermissible method of appraising property in a circumstance in which the
overriding royalty interest produces no net income to its owner, thus resulting in a $0 taxable value. 220 The overriding royalty interest in this
case is unusual because the taxpayer owned the overriding royalty interest (in lignite) merely to insure that it had a lignite supply. 22 1 The essence
of the financial aspects of the royalty is that the taxpayer could not realize
net income from the royalty. 222 The appraisal district asserted that this
relationship is akin to a bargain lease (which is ignored for property tax
purposes in valuing the fee interest) and that the unusual financial aspect
of the royalty should thus be ignored. 223 The court disagreed, reasoning
that an overriding royalty is completely severable from the fee estate
whereas a lease is not, as a below market lease burdens the value of the
fee.

22 4

B. PROCEDURE
In Anderton v. Rockwall Cent. Appraisal Dist.225 the Dallas Court of
Appeals addressed the time limit for a taxpayer challenging under section
25.25(d) 22 6 the market value of open-space land. Open-space land is
213.

TEX. TAX CODE ANN.

§ 11.11 (Vernon Supp. 2001).

214. See Grand Prairie Hosp. Auth. v. Dallas County Appraisal Dist., 730 S.W.2d 849,
851 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Grand Prairie Hosp. Auth. v. Tarrant Appraisal Dist., 707 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
215. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO JC-0311 (Nov. 30, 2000).

216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

6 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, pet. denied).
Id. at 607.
Id. at 605-06.
Id. at 606.
Id.

224. Id.
225. 26 S.W.3d 539 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied).

226.

TEX. TAX CODE ANN.

§ 25.25(d) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
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taxed at its productive value rather than its market value; 227 however, if a
change in use of the land occurs whereby it no longer qualifies as openspace land, then rollback taxes are imposed.2 2 8 Rollback taxes are based
on the difference between the market value and the productive value of
property for the five years preceding the change in use.2 29 In order to be
able to determine the rollback taxes for open-space land that would be
imposed were there a change in use, the appraisal district determines
both the productive value and the market value of open-space land each
year. The procedures and time limits for a taxpayer's challenging the
market value and productive value for open-space land are the same. 230
In 1997 the appraisal district notified Anderton that rollback taxes would
apply because there had been a change in use.2 31 In January 1998,
Anderton filed a motion with the appraisal review board to correct under
section 25.25(d) the tax appraisal rolls of the property for the preceding
five years.2 32 Under section 25.25(d) a taxpayer may move to change the
appraisal roll to correct a substantial error (i.e., the appraised value exceeds the market value by more than one-third) in the appraised value of
the taxpayer's property.2 33 Such a motion may be filed "at any time prior
to the date the taxes become delinquent ....
",234 Anderton asserted that
her motion was timely because the rollback taxes were not due until February 1, 1998.235 The appraisal district asserted that the reference to
"taxes" above are not to the rollback taxes but to the date Anderton's
yearly property taxes become delinquent, thus making her motion untimely.2 36 Reasoning that there is nothing about the assessment of
rollback taxes itself that creates a new reason for a property owner to
have the right to challenge past determinations of appraised values, the
court held that the term "taxes" as used in section 25.25(d) refers only to
yearly property taxes and not rollback taxes.2 37 Thus, Anderton's motion
was not timely.
Several decisions issued during the Survey period addressed the valuation of property. The Dallas Court of Appeals in Sears Roebuck & Co. v.
Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist.238 addressed the valuation of inventory. At
trial, the appraisal district asserted that the market value of Sears' inventory equaled the book value under generally accepted accounting principles of Sears' inventory;23 9 the trial court agreed. 2 40 The trial court
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id. § 23.52(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
Id. § 23.55(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
Id.
Id. § 23.52(b) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
Anderton, 26 S.W.3d at 541.
Id.
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25(d) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
Id.
Anderton, 26 S.W.3d at 541.
Id.
Id. at 543-44.
2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5276 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied).
Id. at 1.

240. Id.
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rejected arguments by Sears that certain reductions should be made to
book value to arrive at fair market value, such as reductions for the cost
of maintaining warranties, reductions for the value of brand names, and
physical, functional and economic obsolescence as indicated by turnover
ratios. 241 In response, the appraisal district stated that Sears kept the
book value of inventory in accordance with GAAP, which values inventory at the lower of cost or value. 242 Sears' primary position at the court
of appeals was that book value cannot equal market value as a matter of
law. 243 The court disagreed, reasoning that (a) the trial court did not conclude as a matter of law that book value equals market value, it merely
used the book values as a strong indication of value that was not overcome by any evidence presented by Sears, 244 and that (b) book value can
serve as an indication of market value. 245 The court distinguished several
authorities cited by Sears in support of its position that book value does
equal market value. In Polk County v. Tenneco, Inc.,246 the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeals erred in equating book
value to market value. 247 The Dallas Court of Appeals distinguished this
case because it involved real property; 248 under the property tax rules,
real property and personal property are valued by very different methods.2 4 9 In Cheek v. Humphries250 the Houston Court of Appeals [14th
Dist.] concluded that "book value is an improper method of determining
'25 1
the value of partnership equipment on dissolution of the partnership."
Again, the Dallas Court of Appeals noted that equipment and inventory
are valued quite differently for property tax purposes. 252 Finally, in
Coastal States Petroleum Co. v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist.,253 the
Corpus Christi Court of Appeals stated that "book value is not necessarily the true market value of . . . inventory .... "254 In response, the
Dallas Court of Appeals reasoned that the language does not preclude
using book value as an indication of market value.255
In Tex-Air Helicopters, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist.,256 the
Texarkana Court of Appeals held that a taxpayer that prevailed in court,
241. Id. at 3.
242. Id.
243. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist., 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5276,
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet. denied).
244. Id. at 17.
245. Id. at 17-18.
246. 554 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1977).
247. Id. at 923.
248. Sears, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5276, at *19.

249. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.01 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (real property is appraised
at market value); but see id. § 23.12 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (inventory is appraised based on
the price a purchaser would pay for inventory is a bulk sale).
250. 800 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
251. Id. at 598.
252. Sears, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5276, at *20.
253. 707 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
254. Id. at 211.
255. Sears, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5276, at *21.
256. 15 S.W.3d 173 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied).
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claiming that its helicopters were being improperly taxed at their full
value rather than an allocated value based on use in Texas, was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. 257 The taxpayer's helicopters were
used in connection with off-shore drilling.2 58 Because of the helicopters'
non-Texas use, the taxpayer asserted, and ultimately prevailed at the
Texas Supreme Court, that it was entitled to an allocation of values for its
helicopters under section 21.05 of the Tax Code.2 59 The taxpayer then
sought an award of attorneys' fees under section 42.29,260 which provides
that a property owner that prevails in an action under section 42.25261 or
section 42.26262 may be awarded attorney's fees. 263 Section 42.25 relates
to controversies concerning the appraised value of property, 264 and section 42.26 relates to controversies relating to unequal appraisals. 265 Although the taxpayer's success in the case concerning the allocated value
of its property lowered the taxable value of its property it did not lower
the appraised value of its property and clearly did not involve an unequal
appraisal issue. 266 Therefore, the court concluded that the taxpayer was
not entitled to attorney's fees under section 42.29.267
In Robinson v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc.,2 68 the Houston Court of
Appeals held that section 22.01,269 which provides that a person shall
render for taxation all tangible personal property used for the production
of income,27 0 is mandatory and that compliance can be judicially compelled.2 71 Although section 22.01 uses the term "shall," 2 72 it had long
been a common belief that section 22.01 is not mandatory given that the
Tax Code does not impose a penalty for failure to render tangible personal property.
IV.

PROCEDURE

The Bandag decision cited above2 73 is interesting not only for its substantive holding but also for its procedural circumstances. The taxpayer
sought and received a declaratory judgment under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, as well a judgment for attorney's fees authorized by
257. Id. at 177. For a discussion of the Houston [14th District] decision that addressed
the proper taxation of these helicopters, which decision was affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court, see C. Ohlenforst, et al., Taxation, 51 SMU Law Review 1345, 1370 (1998).
258. Tex-Air Helicopters, 15 S.W.3d at 174.
259. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 21.05 (Vernon 1992).
260. Id. § 42.29 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
261. Id. § 42.25 (Vernon 1992).
262. Id. § 42.26 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
263. Id. § 42.29 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
264. Id. § 42.25 (Vernon 1992).
265. Id. § 42.26 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
266. Tex-Air Helicopters, 15 S.W.3d at 177.
267. Id.
268. 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5897 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
269. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 22.01 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
270. Id.
271. Robinson, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5897, at *9.
272. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 22.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
273. Bandag, 18 S.W.3d 296; see supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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the Act. 274 The court discussed R Communications, Inc. v. Sharp275 as
well as the legislature's subsequent amendment of section 112.108.276 Ultimately, the court addressed the comptroller's argument that BLC could
not seek declaratory judgment. As the comptroller pointed out, BLC had
paid the franchise tax and did not file an oath of indigency; therefore,
BLC could not complain of an inability to pay the tax.277 The court concluded, however, that a corporation that pays an illegal tax to avoid the
possible forfeiture of its right to do business in the state has a legal claim
for repayment, and that this claim is a well-recognized cause of action
that antedates the statutory provisions at issue.2 78 Noting a parallel to
section 42.08(b) of the Tax Code2 79 (dealing with property tax suits), the
court essentially280 held that section 112.108, even as amended, is
unconstitutional.
The court further disagreed with the comptroller's argument that the
doctrine of governmental immunity barred attorney's fees. The court
concluded that the prohibition against attorney's fees in section 112.108
was "not severable from the remainder of that section and must fall
within the entirety of section 112.108 as an unreasonable financial barrier
281
against access to the courts."
Interaction, Inc. v. State of Texas28 2 is a reminder to all taxpaying entities to keep information filed with the secretary of state current. In this
case, the state sued the operator of a convenience store for unpaid gasoline and sales taxes. Interaction was named as a defendant in this suit, as
an alleged statutory or common law successor to the store operator. The
state failed in its attempt to serve notice of this suit on Interaction's registered agent because the agent had moved back to Lebanon. 283 Although
the Texas address for the vice president of Interaction was handwritten
on the return of the notice to the state, the state chose to substitute service on Interaction through the secretary of state rather than attempting
notice on the vice president of Interaction. 284 In its suit, the state obtained a default judgment against both the store operator and Interaction.
Interaction's first actual notice of this judgment came when the state garnished its bank accounts. At that time, Interaction filed for a bill of review based on its claim that it had neither actual nor constructive notice
274. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.001 et. seq. (Vernon 1997).
275. 875 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. 1994) (which found that the then-in-effect version of Tax

Code § 112.108, which required taxpayers to pay the contested assessment prior to seeking
a judicial remedy, was unconstitutional).
276. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 112.108 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (designed to prohibit declar-

atory judgment except on the filing of an indigency oath and a determination by the court
that the prepayment would constitute an unreasonable restraint on open courts).
277. Bandag, 18 S.W.3d at 303.

278. Id. at 304.
279. TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 42.08(b) (Vernon Supp. 2001)

280. Bandag, 18 S.W.3d at 304.
281. Id. at 305.
282. 17 S.W.3d 775 (Tex. App.283. Id. at 777.
284. Id.

Austin, 2000, no pet.).
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285
of the suit.
Under article 2.11 of the Texas Business Corporation Act, service of
process may be made to the president, vice presidents and the registered
agent of a corporation. 286 However, when, after reasonable diligence, the
registered agent cannot be found, service of process may be given to the
secretary of state as agent of the corporation. 287 Although the court
noted that Interaction would have received actual notice of the lawsuit if
the vice president would have been served at the address written on the
return, it found that the state's choice to effect service of process through
the secretary of state was not in error. 288 Further, the court held that
Interaction was not denied due process by not receiving actual notice of
the default judgment since this lack of actual notice was due to Interacthe address of its registered agent current with the
tion's failure to keep
289
secretary of state.
Detrimental reliance cases continue to present challenges to taxpayers.
Decision 38,635290 involved a taxpayer who contended that interest
291
should be waived because it had detrimentally relied on a prior audit.
The taxpayer argued that the disclaimer statement, the all too familiar
"conclusions to this audit are not to be taken as approval of your tax/fee
reporting system. You are cautioned that in the future you will still be
held liable for all taxes/fees owing and due," might be appropriate in situations in which an auditor simply overlooked a tax that is clear, straightforward, and unambiguous, but not on the facts here. In this case, the
prior auditor had raised the issue specifically with the taxpayer, and apparently accepted the corporation's manner of determining what part of
its business should be allocated to Texas for gross receipts purposes.
While the taxpayer lost this case, 292 there are situations in which taxpayers have been able to show specific evidence that an auditor affirmatively,
if unintentionally, misled the taxpayer and have therefore successfully
claimed detrimental reliance in connection with a prior audit.
Decision 37,843293 is yet another detrimental reliance case. In this one,
the taxpayer claimed that it had relied to its detriment on proposed
franchise Rule 3.572.294 The taxpayer in this hearing argued that it relied to its detriment on that rule, by "reasonably and in good faith [forbearing] its legal right to be a party to a merger, reorganization and asset

285. Id. at 778.

286.

TEX.

Bus.

CORP.

Acr.

ANN.

art. 2.11(A) (West 1980 & Supp. 2000).

287. Id. art. 2.11(B).
288. Interaction, 17 S.W. 3d at 779.
289. Id. at 779-80.
290. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,635 (Dec. 29, 1999).
291. Can you guess the answer to this one yet?
292. (You guessed right, didn't you?)
293. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts. Hearing No. 37,843 (Dec. 29, 1999).
294. Proposed Rule 3.572, announced in November 1991, essentially provided that the
comptroller would disregard certain mergers, reorganizations and asset transfers, by including a presumptive conclusion in the rule that the principal purpose of such transactions
was "evasion or avoidance" of the Texas franchise tax.
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transfer. ' 295 The taxpayer argued that it should not be punished for its
reliance on a rule that the comptroller pronounced as policy and then
failed to enforce. 296 Although the comptroller's ruling on this assertion is
not a surprise (surely everybody guessed that this taxpayer failed to obtain detrimental reliance relief), the reasoning is worth noting.
The decision's conclusion about proposed rules is noteworthy: "An
agency rule proposed under 2001.023 of the Texas Government Code is
merely a notice of the agency's intention to adopt a rule. A proposed
rule may be withdrawn prior to adoption. ' 297 The administrative law
judge therefore concluded that reliance on a proposed rule was not a basis for relief under the comptroller's detrimental reliance policy. Although this taxpayer lost its case (and deserved to), it is worthwhile to
have the agency confirm that a proposed rule is just that-proposed.
In other cases decided during the Survey period, several taxpayers did
receive some type of tax relief due to detrimental reliance on comptroller
298
office's advice.
Decision 37,556,299 a statute of limitations case, focused on computations of business loss carry-forward. The taxpayer, whose audit period
was 1992 through 1996, argued that all issues suggested in determining
taxable earned surplus or taxable capital for those years were open for
debate, protest and redetermination. Accordingly, the taxpayer sought
confirmation through the hearing process that the gain from its sale of
100%-owned subsidiaries, which occurred during the fiscal year ending
January 25, 1995, was not unitary and should therefore be excluded from
the earned surplus tax base. The tax division argued to the contrary,
pointing out that the fiscal year 1995 had a negative earned surplus, so
the issue the taxpayer raised related to a potential loss carry forward
rather than to the determination of the amount due for the audit period.
The comptroller accepted the tax division's assertion that the comptroller
would be able to audit a future year that was impacted by the 1995 transaction. 3 °° The tax division further noted, and the administrative law
judge agreed that "conversely, if the tax division may examine the appropriateness of the 1996 loss carry-forward on the 2001 report, then petitioner is not barred by limitations from taking the 1996 loss carry-forward
in 2001."301 Thus, either party could consider and contest the 1995 trans295. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts. Hearing No. 37,843 (Dec. 29, 1999).
296. In November, 1992 the comptroller abandoned this proposed rule and conceded
that survivors of mergers, reorganizations and transfers of assets would not be liable for
the tax on earned surpluses of non-surviving corporations for 1991 taxable income.
297. Id.
298. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,936 (July 28, 2000) (taxpayer detrimentally relied on comptroller's oral advice regarding taxability of facility charges); Tex. Comp.
Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No, 37,323 (Apr. 19, 2000) (detrimental reliance found on written
advice regarding credit reporting for the apartment industry); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts,
Hearing No. 37,415 (Dec. 15, 1999) (detrimental reliance by taxpayer on oral and written
advice regarding sales of unprocessed rock and stones).
299. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts. Hearing No. 37,556 (Dec. 17, 1999).
300. Id.
301. Id.
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action when the 2001 report was filed. Essentially, the administrative law
judge accepted the tax division's contention that the issue was not a "con302
tested case" at this point.
In a hearing relating to tax assessed based on comptroller estimates,
the comptroller was limited in her attempted extension of the audit beyond the statute of limitations. 30 3 The taxpayer in this case was a convenience store operator who was audited by the comptroller's office for
sales tax compliance. Due to the unavailability of accounting records, the
auditor resorted to an estimate of taxes due based on the information
available. The gross error rate calculated by the auditor based on this
information was 237.63% for a six-month period. Based on this calculation, the auditor sought to extend the audit assessment beyond the fouryear statute of limitations period, since the error rate calculated exceeded
the 25% threshold in section 111.205(b) of the Texas Tax Code. However, the administrative law judge found that it was improper to apply the
comptroller's estimated gross error rate for periods prior to the four-year
audit period, because the evidence in the record did not show that the
volume and nature of the taxpayer's sales at the beginning of the "extended" audit period were comparable to those for the six-month period. 30 4 Thus, the exception to the four-year statute of limitations was not
available to the comptroller (at least with regard to most of the extended
audit).
The comptroller's office adopted several procedural changes during
2000, including re-naming its "Hearings Attorneys" as "Assistant General
Counsel," and re-naming the "Tax Division" as the "Administrative
Hearings Section." In addition, the comptroller made significant headway in reducing the number of backlogged cases and in resolving some
disputed cases through mediation.
V.

CONCLUSION

As this article went to print, the Texas Legislature was analyzing numerous tax-related provisions, including several recommended by Comptroller Carol Keeton Rylander. In addition to proposing technical
amendments, the comptroller urged legislators to adopt the recommendations of the E-TAG Committee, a group of industry and local representatives (officially the Texas E-Commerce and Technology Advisory Group)
who met throughout the Survey period to review and analyze issues related to electronic commerce and tax issues. The group recommended,
for example, that Texas should become a "participating state" in the
Streamlined Sales Tax Project, and Texas had already elected to do so by
the time this article went to print. In addition, the group recommended
other changes focused on treating sales of goods the same-i.e, taxable or
nontaxable-regardless of whether they were delivered over the Internet
302. Id.
303. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,459 (Apr. 20, 2000).
304. Id.
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or through a traditional brick and mortar retailer, and on continuing to
help Texas businesses and consumers face the e-commerce age successfully (e.g., recommending an increase to the current exemption for data
processing information services from twenty percent to forty percent, and
by increasing the exemption for Internet access from $25 to $50 per
month).
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